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SB 10: Punishment Before Conviction? Alleviating
Economic Injustice in California with Bail Reform
Kyle Harrison*
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1278, 1284, 1289, 1295, 1318, and 1318.1 (amended, repealed, and
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1288, 1319, and 1319.5 (amended and repealed).
SB 10 (Hertzberg); Held in Assembly Appropriations.
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I. INTRODUCTION
On an early spring morning in 2010, sixteen-year-old Kalief Browder was
heading home through the Bronx, coming back from a party.1 A squad car pulled
up, and officers stopped the young man to question him about a robbery.2 As
more police arrived, an officer accused Kalief of robbing a man and taking a
backpack.3 “I didn’t rob anybody,” he said.4 “You can check my pockets.”5 After
finding nothing in the search, the police handcuffed and brought him to the
precinct for interrogation, saying, “most likely you can go home.”6 Browder
maintained his innocence, yet the prosecution charged him with robbery, grand
larceny, and assault.7 The judge set bail at $3,000—more than Browder’s family
could afford.8 A week later, Kalief turned 17 in Rikers Island.9 Browder spent
three long years maintaining his innocence, refusing to plea, waiting for a trial,
and suffering unimaginable abuse from the inmates and staff.10 Four days after
his 20th birthday, the prosecution dropped all charges and Kalief Browder
returned home.11 Two years after his release, Kalief hanged himself as a result of
the trauma he experienced in Rikers.12 His inability to afford a $3,000 bail sent
him down the path that led him to take his own life.13 Kalief told ABC News,
“[t]he way the system is, you’re guilty ‘till proven innocent.”14
The consequences of pretrial detention are often unforeseen and have severe
results.15 Individuals locked up for even a few days can lose their jobs, homes, or

1. Jennifer Gonnerman, Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/
magazine/2014/10/06/before-the-law (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. (“[T]he U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York described [Rikers] as a place
with a ‘deep-seated culture of violence,’ where attacks by officers and among inmates are rampant.”).
11. Id.
12. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Kalief Browder, 1993-2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“[Kalief] endured about two years in solitary confinement, where he attempted to end his
life several times.”).
13. Alysia Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2015),
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/09/no-bail-less-hope-the-death-of-kalief-browder#.CXkb6jApz (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
14. ABC News, Kalief Browder’s Life Behind Bars and Who He Might Have Been, YOUTUBE (June 18,
2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kv6gSl4JcFA (transcript on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
15. Paul Heaton, ARTICLE: The Downstream Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69
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custody of their children.16 Some judges are adjusting their outlook on pretrial
detention after learning that detaining low-risk defendants before trial makes
them significantly more likely to be repeat offenders.17 People with the financial
means to post bail have the advantage of preparing a stronger defense from the
outside.18 They can enroll in programs, look for evidence or witnesses that
support their case, and appear well-presented in court, which all show the judge
that a strict punishment is not necessary.19 People without financial means have
none of these advantages.20 They often will plead guilty just to get out of jail,
even if innocent, which will disrupt their lives even more—all because they
could not afford bail.21 California’s average bail is $50,000—five times higher
than the rest of the country.22 California taxpayers spend millions of dollars every
day to house approximately 47,000 detainees awaiting trial.23 These defendants
make up about 60% of the jail population.24 Many of them could be safely
released after a risk assessment to await trial and attend court on their own, at no
cost to taxpayers.25 Instead, the current system jails until trial those who cannot
afford bail.26
“In our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial
is the carefully limited exception.”27 The Supreme Court of the United States

STAN. L. REV. 711, 713 (2017).
16. Heaton, supra note 15, at 713.
17. Michael Hardy, In Fight Over Bail’s Fairness, a Sheriff Joins the Critics, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/us/houston-bail-reform-sheriff-gonzalez.html (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review); see CHRISTOPHER LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER
HOLSINGER, LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2013),
available
at
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_
FNL.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“When held 2-3 days, low-risk defendants are
almost 40 percent more likely to commit new crimes before trial than equivalent defendants held no more than
24 hours.”).
18. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “NOT IN IT FOR JUSTICE”: HOW CALIFORNIA’S PRETRIAL DETENTION AND
BAIL SYSTEM UNFAIRLY PUNISHES POOR PEOPLE 4 (2017) available at https://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/report_pdf/usbail0417_web_0.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
19. Id.
20. Heaton, supra note 15, at 714; Alexandra Natapoff, Why Misdemeanors Aren’t So Minor, SLATE
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/04/misdemeanors_can
_have_major_consequences_for_the_people_charged_.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
21. Heaton, supra note 15, at 714; Natapoff, supra note 20.
22. It’s Time to do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Apr. 7, 2017, 8:00
AM), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/editorials/article143174454.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987).
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wrote those words 30 years ago.28 But courts across the country incarcerate poor
people awaiting trial because they cannot afford the cost of bail, while wealthy
individuals in the same position, charged with the same crime, walk free.29 The
current system does not focus on detaining those who pose a threat to society, or
who are flight risks—it disproportionately punishes the poor and people of
color.30 The system allows multi-millionaires, like Robert Durst, who was
charged with murder, to post $250,000 in bail and skip town,31 while 16-year-old
Kalief Browder, wrongfully charged with robbing someone and taking a
backpack, spent three years of his life in Rikers Island awaiting trial.32
Although Kalief’s story occurred in New York, the inequities of the bail
system are widespread across the country and are especially present in
California.33 To address these economic inequalities in California’s criminal
justice system, SB 10 requires each county to establish pretrial service agencies
that are charged with providing tailored recommendations to the courts on
pretrial detention or release based on the nature of the defendant’s flight risk and
potential threat to public safety.34 The agencies will be responsible for providing
services and supervision of the defendants.35 But the primary factor for the
agency’s recommendation is focused on the defendant’s potential flight risk, and
the safety of the community.36
SB 10 aims to lower the number of inmates in California’s jails who are
locked up solely because they cannot afford bail.37 This legislation is a complete
reform of the pretrial decision-making in California, which will undoubtedly

28. Id.
29. Locked Up for Being Poor, N.Y. TIMES (May 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/05/
opinion/locked-up-for-being-poor.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. Jazmine Ulloa, Some Say California’s Bail System is Broken. Here’s How Two Legislators Plan to
Help Fix It, L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-bail-reform-analysis20170609-htmlstory.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
31. Polly Mosendz, Robert Durst’s History of Skipping Bail Comes Back to Haunt Him, NEWSWEEK
(Mar. 23, 2015), http://www.newsweek.com/robert-durst-jinx-denied-bail-316108 (on file with The University
of the Pacific Law Review).
32. Gonnerman, supra note 1.
33. Kamala D. Harris and Rand Paul, Kamala Harris and Rand Paul: To Shrink Jails, Let’s Reform Bail,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2017) https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/20/opinion/kamala-harris-and-rand-paul-letsreform-bail.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); It’s Time to do Away with California’s
Cash Bail System, supra note 22.
34. SENATE FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 10, at 1 (May 30, 2017); Jazmine Ulloa, Here’s How State
Lawmakers Plan to Reform the Bail System in California, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2017),
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-pol-sac-bail-reform-legislation-20170326-story.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
35. SENATE FLOOR, FLOOR ANALYSIS OF SB 10, at 6–7 (May 30, 2017).
36. Marisa Lagos, Lawmakers Aim to Limit Cash Bail, Say it ‘Punishes Poor for Being Poor’, KQED
NEWS (Mar. 27, 2017), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/03/27/lawmakers-aim-to-limit-cash-bail-say-itpunishes-poor-for-being-poor/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
37. Id.

536

The University of the Pacific Law Review / Vol. 49
diminish the commercial bail bond industry.38 Part II lays out the historical
context of bail in the United States, the federal approach, California’s current
system, and other approaches around the United States.39 This article then looks
at the present essential provisions of SB 10 that will overhaul the current bail
system, followed by an analysis of what SB 10 will do if approved the coming
year.40
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Senator Hertzberg, along with many coauthors, introduced SB 10 to shift
pretrial detention decision-making to focus on the magnitude of the risk to
society, rather than detaining defendants who are unable to afford bail.41 Part A
addresses the historical perspective of bail along with its current problems.42 Part
B discusses the federal reform movement that took place in the 1960s.43 Part C
addresses the California Constitution along with existing California law, and part
D examines the different approaches to solving the inequalities in the bail system
around the country.44
A. Bail Bonds Historically
Most jurisdictions in the United States have two ways to make bail: either
post the whole sum up front or go through a commercial bondsman.45 Almost no
one can afford the full amount of bail up front.46 Those who can pay a
commercial bail bondsman typically pay 10% of the bail amount for their
freedom, while the bondsman will cover the rest.47 In California the average bail
is $50,000; the presumed innocent defendant must then pay a non-refundable
$5,000 payment to the bail bonds company for their freedom.48 Given that 47%

38. Jails Exist For Punishment or Public Safety, Not For Locking People up Who Can’t Afford Bail, L.A.
TIMES (May 31, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-bail-reform-20170531-story.html (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
39. Infra Part II.
40. Infra Parts III–IV.
41. Lagos, supra note 36.
42. Infra Part II.A.
43. Infra Part II.B.
44. Infra Part II.C–D.
45. Nick Pinto, The Bail Trap, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/16/
magazine/the-bail-trap.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
46. RICHARD G. SINGER, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE II: FROM BAIL TO JAIL 11 (2008).
47. Id.
48. Bob Hertzberg, Bail System Will be Fairer if California Passes This Bill, THE PRESS-ENTERPRISE
(May 31, 2017, 12:04 AM), http://www.pe.com/2017/05/31/bail-system-will-be-fairer-if-california-passes-thisbill/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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of Americans do not have $400 for an emergency expense, it is clear how the
current system harms the poor.49
Bail is a common law relic that originated in England during the Middle
Ages as a way to ensure a defendant’s appearance at trial without incarcerating
him until then.50 The defendant or the defendant’s relatives would pledge a bond
for his or her freedom.51 This bond might be secured by money or real property
as collateral to ensure the defendant arrived at court, or it sometimes would be
unsecured.52 Without this system of pretrial release, jails would quickly
overcrowd if every defendant awaiting trial were incarcerated.53 In 1689,
England banned the practice of incarcerating individuals before trial by setting
exorbitant bail, proclaiming, “excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed.”54 A century later, the United States Constitution adopted the
same language in the Eighth Amendment.55 Though bail stems from English
common law, commercial bail bonds were never permitted in England—this was
an American invention.56
Popular shows like “Dog the Bounty Hunter”57 have normalized the bail
bond industry to Americans, even though the United States stands as an outlier as
one of only two countries on the planet that has commercial bail bonds
companies.58 There are important reasons why the United States adopted a
commercial bail system at the inception of our nation.59 At the time, most states’
constitutions guaranteed the absolute right to receive bail except in capital
cases—separating themselves from English law.60 Early America had vast
frontiers and the lack of community ties or close proximity to neighbors made it
difficult for courts to receive sureties or bonds for many defendants.61 Nomadic
defendants could easily skip town and avoid ever facing justice for their crimes.62
America’s fondness for capitalism and entrepreneurialism, coupled with the spirit
49. Id.
50. Pinto, supra note 45; Adam Liptak, Illegal Globally, Bail for Profit Remains in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/29/us/29bail.html (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
51. Pinto, supra note 45.
52. Pinto, supra note 45; Liptak, supra note 50.
53. SINGER, supra note 46, at 11.
54. Pinto, supra note 45.
55. Pinto, supra note 45; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
56. WAYNE H. THOMAS JR., BAIL REFORM IN AMERICA 12 (1976).
57. Dog the Bounty Hunter (A&E).
58. Last Week Tonight, Bail: Last Week Tonight with John Oliver (HBO), YOUTUBE (June 7, 2015),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IS5mwymTIJU (transcript on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review); Liptak, supra note 50.
59. THOMAS, supra note 56, at 11–12.
60. Id. at 12.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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of sovereignty, spawned the creation of the bail bond industry in the early
1800s.63 Commercial bail bonds were an effective tool in early America for
ensuring the defendant’s return for trial, and preventing jail overcrowding.64
Money bail has seen a steady incline over the past 20-years.65 An ACLU
study found that the percentage of people required to post money bail increased
from 37%–61% from 1990 to 2009.66 Most defendants and families face two
realistic possibilities:67 wait in jail for trial, possibly for months—an option that
has been proven to increase the likelihood of conviction as well as be dangerous
to the detainee’s physical and mental health68—or pay 10% to a commercial
bondsman, if possible, potentially leaving the family with massive debt.69
B. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966
Criticism of the money bail system is not a new trend.70 Famous French
political scientist Alexis de Toqueville voiced his derision of the system in the
early 1800s: “[Bail] is hostile to the poor and favorable only to the rich.”71 A
recognition of the inequality of money bail toward the indigent spurred parts of
the country to begin reform in the 1960s.72 In 1961, the Vera Foundation began
an experimental study called the Manhattan Bail Project, which looked at the
effects of pretrial detention on defendants.73 The Manhattan Bail Project proved
successful—individuals judged not to be public safety or flight risks were
released and overwhelmingly returned for their court dates.74 Shortly after the
release of the promising results of the Manhattan Bail Project, with the support of
Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Congress passed the Federal Bail Reform Act
of 1966.75 This Act created a presumption that all federal criminal defendants be
released on their personal recognizance, without any requirement of bail.76 The

63. Liptak, supra note 50.
64. THOMAS, supra note 56, at 12.
65. Gillian B. White, Who Really Makes Money Off of Bail Bonds?, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/05/bail-bonds/526542/ (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 63 (1835) (criticizing the commercial bail
system in his book, Democracy in America, “[Bail] is hostile to the poor and favorable only to the rich.”).
71. Id.
72. SINGER, supra note 46, at 12.
73. Heaton, supra note 15, at 724.
74. SINGER, supra note 46, at 12.
75. THOMAS, supra note 56, at 6–7.
76. Id. at 7.
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use of money bail should only be utilized if nonfinancial conditional release
would not sufficiently assure the defendant’s return to court.77 The passage of
this Act prompted a dozen states to revise their bail laws over the succeeding five
years.78 While alleviating the problem of poverty was a central focus in the
1960s, the bail reform movement among the states ended swiftly when the Nixon
administration arrived.79 The new president shifted focus from poverty to crime
and the “law and order” candidate brought sweeping, lasting changes to the
criminal justice system.80
C. Existing California Law
Article I Section 12 of the California Constitution states that “a person shall
be released on bail by sufficient sureties,” with few offenses as exceptions.81 The
offenses excluded from receiving bail are capital crimes and felony offenses
involving acts of violence or sexual assault, both where the facts are evident or
the presumption of guilt is great.82 Another exception is any felony offense where
the defendant has threatened another with great bodily harm and there is a
substantial likelihood that the threat would be carried out if the person were
released.83
Under Penal Code section 1275, when deciding bail, a judge shall consider
the safety of the public, the seriousness of the charge, prior criminal history, and
the likelihood of the defendant returning to court.84 To assess the seriousness of
the crime, the judge will consider the harm and threats towards the victim, the
alleged use of a firearm, or the alleged possession or use of controlled
substances.85
Under Penal Code section 1269(b), an officer in the jail may accept bail in
the amount fixed by the arrest warrant or by the bail schedule and set a place and
time for the individual’s appearance in court.86 Every year superior court judges
must review the countywide bail schedule for misdemeanor offenses.87 Judges
have discretion to decide the amount of bail, which must be “reasonable and

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
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Id. at 8.
Id. at 8–9.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 12.
Id.
Id.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1275(a) (West 2017).
Id.
Id. at § 1269b(a).
Id. at § 1269b(c).
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sufficient” for the individual to appear in court.88 Section 1270 provides that a
court may release an individual who has been arrested for any offense other than
a capital offense, on his or her own recognizance, and section 1270.1 allows a
judge to deviate from the bail schedule for safety reasons.89 Penal Code sections
1318 and 1319 designate conditions for the individual’s release or remained
custody.90
D. Different Approaches Around the United States
Over the years, various jurisdictions have attempted to reform the bail
system, but the majority of states still adhere to the money bail practice.91 Four
states have completely banned commercial bail bondsmen: Illinois, Kentucky,
Oregon and Wisconsin.92 Washington D.C. was influenced by the federal system,
and got rid of money bail decades ago—it has a system that is completely absent
of money, with pretrial officers allowing most defendants to go with just a
signature.93 The District of Columbia is showing the nation that it is possible to
create a more just system without jeopardizing public safety.94 In 2016, New
Mexico citizens voted to bar judges from detaining low-risk defendants who pose
little threat but cannot make bail.95 Arizona updated its pretrial court system,
essentially abolishing bail.96 New Jersey is the latest state in the union to tackle
reform—the state completely eliminated bail and replaced it with a risk
assessment system.97 This effectively freed 40% of the defendants who were only
locked up because they could not afford bail.98

88. Id. at § 815a.
89. Id. at §§ 1270, 1270.1.
90. Id. at §§ 1318, 1319.
91. Heaton, supra note 15, at 733.
92. Id.
93. Ann Marimow, When it Comes to Pretrial Release, Few Other Jurisdictions Do it D.C.’s Way, WASH.
POST (July 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-safety/when-it-comes-to-pretrial-releasefew-other-jurisdictions-do-it-dcs-way/2016/07/04/8eb52134-e7d3-11e5-b0fd073d5930a7b7_story.html?utm_term=.28919afdaa11 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
94. See id. (“There is no evidence you need money to get people back to court,” said Morrison, a judge
since 1979. “It’s irrational, ineffective, unsafe and profoundly unfair.”).
95. An-Li Herring, States and Cities Take Steps to Reform ‘Dishonest’ Bail System, NPR (Dec. 17, 2016,
8:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/12/17/505852280/states-and-cities-take-steps-to-reform-dishonest-bailsystem (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
96. It’s Time to do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, supra note 22.
97. #783: New Jersey Bails Out, CAPITAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 12, 2017), http://www.npr.org/
sections/money/2017/07/12/536905881/episode-783-new-jersey-bails-out (downloaded using iTunes) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
98. Id.
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Santa Clara County, California, deviated from the state bail system in 2012.99
The county implemented a risk evaluation program to reduce the unnecessarily
high jail population, which resulted in millions dollars of savings after choosing
not to detain those who could not afford bail.100 The cost per year to the county to
provide the pretrial services is around $7 million, but the savings from no longer
detaining non-convicted defendants is around $60 million.101 Of the defendants
released in Santa Clara County, 95% make all court appearances and almost 99%
are not rearrested as they await trial.102 The authors of SB 10 aim to bring the
benefits of the Santa Clara County system to the statewide level.103
III. SENATE BILL 10
Senate Bill (SB) 10 aims to completely overhaul the bail system in California
by amending, repealing, or adding new text to 26 sections of the Penal Code.104
Assembly Member Rob Bonta introduced AB 42, an identical bill to SB 10, that
failed to make it out of the assembly.105 With this legislation, Senator Hertzberg
and coauthors attempt to reform California’s bail system by safely reducing the
number of pretrial detainees who are in jail merely because they cannot afford to
post bail.106 This bill eliminates county bail schedules and requires each county to
create a pretrial service agency charged with providing the court
recommendations, suggesting whether each defendant should be released or held
in continued custody based off the pretrial risk assessment of the individual.107
The legislature has attempted to fix the bail system before, but the bills either
failed to make it to the governor’s desk or failed to alleviate the specific problem

99. Jails Exist For Punishment or Public Safety, Not For Locking People up Who Can’t Afford Bail,
supra note 38.
100. California’s Bail System is Inequitable and Doesn’t Make Us Safer, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 2, 2017),
http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/California-s-bail-system-is-inequitable-and-11044858.php
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
101. Jails Exist For Punishment or Public Safety, Not For Locking People up Who Can’t Afford Bail,
supra note 38.
102. Robert Hertzberg, Assembly Standing Comm. on Pub. Safety Hearing of 07-11-2017, DIGITAL
DEMOCRACY (July 11, 2017), https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/54079?startTime=0&vid=58c84d9f8e
2ec0d35c89bbe71640b4ee [hereinafter Public Safety Hearing] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
103. California’s Bail System is Inequitable and Doesn’t Make Us Safer, supra note 100.
104. SB 10, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sept. 6, 2017).
105. Jazmine Ulloa, Legislation to Overhaul Bail Reform in California Hits a Hurdle in Assembly, L.A.
TIMES (June 1, 2017, 11:37 P.M.), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politicsupdates-legislation-to-overhaul-bail-reform-in-1496385464-htmlstory.html (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review).
106. SB 10, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sept. 6, 2017); SENATE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 10, at 2 (Apr. 4, 2017).
107. SB 10, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sept. 6, 2017).
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that SB 10 intends to solve.108 Part A focuses on Sections 1275, 1275a, and
1275b, where the primary mechanics of the risk assessment are spelled out.109
Part B focuses on other important repeals, amendments, and additions to the
Penal Code that SB 10 implements.110
A. Section 1275, 1275a & 1275b of the Penal Code
This bill repeals Penal Code section 1275, and in its place creates a pretrial
release hearing where the judge will assess the recommendation provided by the
pretrial agency and decide whether to release the defendant based on a multitude
of factors.111 These factors include an individual’s prior criminal history, the
harm or threats to the victim, and the use of a deadly weapon during the crime.112
However, the most important factors for the judge to consider are the safety of
the public, the security of the victim, and the likelihood of the accused being a
flight risk.113
Under Section 1275a, the court will receive the pretrial agency’s
recommendation and may agree with the agency’s decision or decide
otherwise.114 If the court uses its discretion and decides against the pretrial
agency’s assessment, they must provide their reasoning.115 After receiving the
pretrial release report and evaluating the arguments from the parties, the judge
may still set monetary bail if he or she opines that the defendant will not appear
in court as required.116 When monetary bail is required, the judge must inquire
about the defendant’s capacity to pay.117 The judge must not set bail in an amount
that causes the defendant’s detention solely because of an inability to afford that
amount.118 The absence of the pretrial service report at the time of the hearing
does not automatically prohibit the individual’s release.119
Under section 1275b, if the defendant is charged with a capital crime, a
felony involving an act of violence, or a felony sexual assault, and there are
evident facts or the presumption of guilt is great, the individual will be taken into
custody before trial.120 A prosecuting attorney may seek pretrial detention at any
108.
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110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 10, at 2 (Apr. 4, 2017).
Infra Part III.A.
Infra Part III.B.
SB 10, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. §§ 16, 17(a) (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sep. 6, 2017).
Id. at § 17(a)(2).
Id. at § 17(a)(1).
Id. at § 18(b)(1).
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Id. at § 18(c)(1).
Id. at § 18(c)(2).
Id.
Id. at 18(e).
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time by filing a motion with the court, even after the defendant has been
released.121 The defendant will be permitted to present evidence, witnesses, and
cross-examine witnesses at the hearing.122 To decide on pretrial detention, the
court will consider the safety risk to the public and the victim, the nature of the
crime, the defendant’s criminal record, the weight of the evidence, the flight risk
of the defendant, and the presumption of innocence.123
B. Other Provisions
SB 10 repeals section 1269b of the Penal Code and adds new language
stating that an individual who is arrested for an enumerated violent felony shall
not be considered for release until the individual appears in court for a hearing
before a judge.124 The agency will not perform a pretrial risk evaluation unless
the individual requests one.125 This section also states that an individual may not
be released until that person appears before a judge for a hearing, and the agency
conducts an assessment and provides the court with a recommendation if that
person is arrested for: a serious felony; intimidating a witness for a spousal rape,
domestic violence, or stalking; domestic violence battery; violation of court order
involving threats towards another party; or any felony committed while the
individual was on pretrial release for a prior offense.126 SB 10 aims to repeal
Penal Code section 1289 and in its place, adds new text to allow courts to change
the conditions of the pretrial status, including requiring the addition of bail as
circumstances change.127 The prosecution can motion that bail be set or increased
as more facts become known.128
The addition of new text in section 1318.1 states the requirements for the
pretrial services agencies established in each county.129 Agencies will be charged
with gathering information on the newly arrested individuals, performing pretrial
risk assessments, and providing recommendations to the court that are
specifically tailored to each defendant.130 Agencies are also tasked with providing
pretrial services, as well as supervising any defendants on pretrial release.131
Section 1318.2 is a new addition to the Penal Code that charges the Judicial
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Council to provide rules to each county pretrial agency to develop and provide
guidelines for the risk assessment tool used for each individual.132 Each county is
required to share its factors and data from the risk assessment tool guidelines
with the Judicial Council to best create a risk assessment tool based off of
empirical data and evidenced based practices.133 SB 10 reiterates that the intent of
the legislation is to alleviate the disparate impacts on minorities and low-income
communities in pretrial detention decision-making.134
IV. ANALYSIS
Senate Bill 10 is a complete overhaul of California’s current bail system.135
By establishing pre-trial service agencies in each county to provide tailored
recommendations to the court on detention or release based on safety and flight
risks, SB 10 reforms the current system in which the people who remain detained
are those who cannot afford bail.136 This legislation does not completely remove
the option of money bail, but its passing will undoubtedly upend the commercial
bail industry in California.137 The authors hope that SB 10 brings about the same
changes found in Santa Clara County—a reduction in the jail population and
millions of dollars saved for the county, all with no increased threat to public
safety.138 Part A of this section assesses whether SB 10 will accomplish the goals
it sets out, looking at the jail population, public safety, and the fiscal impact of
the bill.139 Part B addresses the constitutional issues that SB 10 is intended to
avoid, and Part C looks at other arguments and the reasons why SB 10 became a
two-year bill.140
A. Will SB 10 Do What It Says It Will Do?
The central argument made by the proponents of this legislation is that SB 10
will create a justice system that is fairer to the poor.141 SB 10 will lower jail

132. Id. at § 37(a).
133. Id. at §§ 38(b), (h).
134. Id. at §§ 2, 38(i).
135. SB 10, 2017 Leg., 2017–2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (as amended on Sep. 6, 2017).
136. SENATE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 10, at 2 (Apr. 4, 2017).
137. Jazmine Ulloa, ‘Dog the Bounty Hunter’ Joins Opponents of Bail Reform in California, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 18, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/politics/essential/la-pol-ca-essential-politics-updates-poor-people-arenot-in-jail-for-being-1492541645-htmlstory.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
138. California’s Bail System is Inequitable and Doesn’t Make Us Safer, supra note 100.
139. Infra Part IV.A.
140. Infra Parts IV.B–IV.C.
141. Rob Bonta, Assembly Standing Comm. on Pub. Safety Hearing of 07-11-2017, DIGITAL
DEMOCRACY (July 7, 2017), https://ca.digitaldemocracy.org/hearing/54079?startTime=0&vid=58c84d9f8
e2ec0d35c89bbe71640b4ee (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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populations and enhance public safety by focusing on risk assessments, rather
than use of arbitrary bail schedules to determine a defendant’s pretrial release.142
SB 10 will also save the state money by no longer unnecessarily housing
defendants deemed safe to return to their communities.143 Opponents
acknowledge that county bail schedules are too high and that the system is unfair
to the poor, but their biggest concern is their perception that the bill moves too
far, too fast.144
1. Will SB 10 Lower Jail Populations?
Proponents and opponents of this legislation both agree that SB 10 will lower
jail populations—though this is a core problem with the bill, given the safety
concerns.145 The assurance of a reduced jail population can be predicted by
looking at other states that have implemented similar legislation.146 New Jersey is
the most recent state to undergo bail reform and is a fitting comparison to
California.147 Also utilizing risk assessments in pretrial agencies, New Jersey has
seen a 30% reduction in the jail population in the first months of the newly
enacted legislation.148 California can expect similar results if SB 10 passes in the
coming year.149
2. Will SB 10 Enhance Public Safety?
SB 10 is not a pilot program—it follows successful models that have been
implemented around the country.150 Kentucky has a similar system focusing on
risk assessment that provides California with assuring guidance.151 In Kentucky,
89% of released defendants are present at all future court dates, and 92% of those
on pretrial release are not rearrested.152 With similar results, Santa Clara County
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144. Elizabeth Ratnoff, Assembly Standing Comm. on Pub. Safety Hearing of 07-11-2017, DIGITAL
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(Aug. 13, 2017), http://www.dailynews.com/government-and-politics/20170813/to-fix-unfair-bail-system-willcalifornia-copy-kentucky (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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has more than 95% of those released pretrial return to all court appearances.153
And of those released pretrial in Santa Clara County, 99% are not rearrested
when released.154 This data helps show that the risk assessment tools are effective
at ensuring trial appearances and preventing future crimes.155 In states that do not
use the pretrial systems the failure to appear rate is at least three times higher
than the five percent failure to appear rate in Santa Clara County.156
The link between length of detention and recidivism is another factor the
proponents are using to convince lawmakers to support SB 10.157 The majority of
people arrested and brought to jail, convicted or otherwise, will at some point be
released.158 Therefore, any debate over public safety should address preventing
future crimes.159 Individuals detained for 8–14 days compared to those detained
for no more than 24 hours are 51% more likely to commit a new crime and end
up back in jail.160 This suggests there is a strong link between time spent in jail
and future crimes, which is persuasive evidence that we should try to minimize
the amount of unnecessary pre-trial detention—especially because law
enforcement occasionally arrests the wrong individuals.161
This data challenges those who feel criminals are coddled—according to
Duane Chapman, “Dog the Bounty Hunter,” bail reform is a “hug-a-thug”
program.162 The bail industry states that SB 10 requires that courts release
misdemeanor defendants unless there is a finding that public safety is threatened
or the defendant poses a flight risk.163 Accordingly, they contend SB 10
endangers the security of the public by mandating the mandatory release of highrisk misdemeanor offenders without bail.164 The actual outcomes of lowering jail
populations are a real concern to victim advocates, district attorneys, and
judges.165 Acknowledging the inherent inequality in the current bail system,
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154. Id.
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Sacramento County Superior Court Judge Steve White called an early version of
SB 10 “a serious risk to public safety.”166 The Judicial Council and Chief Justice
Tani Cantil-Sakauye agreed with the goals of the bill in June 2017, but remained
concerned with the balance of administration of justice and public safety.167
Some opponents have argued that bail is a strong public safety tool because the
family and friends of the defendant have a financial incentive to make sure the
defendant attends his or her court dates.168 But the argument that the current bail
system is a strong public safety tool is not very accurate169 The bail bondsman’s
main concern is protecting his or her investment—the defendant missing court is
the main concern.170 If the police arrest someone who commits a crime out on
bail and returns him or her to jail, the investment is protected—defendants in jail
do not miss court.171 Supporters of SB 10 argue the bail industry’s concern is not
public safety, but rather losing a profitable $2 billion dollar per year industry.172
This is despite the bail industry’s continued rhetoric of criminals going “free to
roam our neighborhoods,” blatantly stoking the fears of the public.173 The authors
were convinced that the best step forward for public safety is to turn SB 10 into a
two-year bill and continue to work with district attorneys and the Judicial
Council.174 Governor Jerry Brown and Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye are now
openly supporting SB 10, which improves California’s chances of seeing
significant reforms to the bail system next year.175
3. Will SB 10 Provide Costs or Savings?
An unidentified factor in this legislation is the bail overhaul’s fiscal impact
on the state.176 Taking into consideration the creation of the pretrial service
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agencies, compliance and monitoring of defendants, risk assessment tools, and
any costs of appointing counsel, the costs are thought to be in the hundreds of
millions of dollars annually.177 The state will ultimately be required to reimburse
the counties’ annual costs of operating the pretrial service agencies.178
Looking at Santa Clara County’s program, the county’s annual costs to
provide the pretrial services are between $6–7 million per year.179 But the savings
incurred from no longer jailing the non-convicted defendants are around $60
million per year.180 The proponents of this legislation argue that the same results
can be brought to California at the statewide level.181 Some in the bail industry
argue that the costs to the state would reach more than $2 billion annually,
although this figure seems hyperbolic, with no independent analysis reporting the
number.182 A problem with extrapolating Santa Clara’s data to California as a
whole is that every county is different.183 The costs in some counties will be low
and others will see massive expenses.184 Santa Clara County and Los Angeles
County, for example, face different problems in pursuing justice.185 Aware of this
issue, the authors of the bill want to encourage the creation of effective pretrial
service agencies, but the cost of this worthy ambition is unknown.186 The status
quo of using countywide bail schedules is easy and cost efficient, but is
questionably unjust187 It seems likely that the cost of creating and implementing
the pretrial agencies will initially be high.188 But as the counties begin to lower
their jail populations by no longer housing low-risk defendants, the state might
see considerable savings.189 Even if it does cost more money, cost is not
necessarily the determining factor in ascertaining the merit of the bill.190
Arguable, to the extent we really are needlessly jailing people before trial, a more
fair justice system could very well be worth the increased cost.191
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B. Impact on the Bail Industry and Moving Forward
The effect on the bail industry is another cost that should be factored into the
analysis.192 Even though this legislation does not eliminate the option of money
bail, it is likely that with the passage of SB 10, the bail industry in California will
collapse, or at least be greatly reduced.193 Opponents claim that this bill will
eliminate 1,600 jobs in California’s bail bond industry194 But even if jobs are
eliminated, to the extent the state saves money and creates a more fair justice
system, such a loss may well be worth it.195 Keeping industry for the sake of
keeping jobs around is not a great argument, especially if the industry exists off
of higher crime rates.196 Judges and district attorneys are concerned about
unrealistic deadlines for decisions to be made for detainees.197 District attorneys’
tight deadlines to supply a motion from the time of the arrest could result in poor
decision-making from the court.198 Concerned about high levels of risk
assessment, Senator Jeff Stone raised the issue of risk assessments actually
increasing the number of those jailed via this legislation.199 This claim, however,
seems to lack merit because the results would likely mirror those found in the
other states that use a risk assessment, which are lower jail populations.200
Senator Stone also questions what should happen to bail bonds companies that
file for bankruptcy, or who returns the defendants that skip town.201 These issues,
though they should not be overlooked entirely, do not address the flaws in the
current bail system, and do not appear to be significant enough to overcome the
potential value of a more just system.202
C. Avoiding Constitutional Issues
Bail is guaranteed under the California Constitution.203 SB 10 section 127
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remains consistent with Article I, Section 12 of the California Constitution.204
The language mirrors the California Constitution with the offenses that are
exempt from receiving bail.205 Capital crimes, felonies with violent acts or sexual
assaults, as well as felonies with directed threats towards a victim will all be
exempt from having the option of bail.206 This permits district attorneys and
judges to use preventative detention for those who are deemed too dangerous to
be released.207 The authors of this legislation want to be careful not to completely
write out the option of money bail, so as to avoid any potential constitutional
challenges.208 SB 10 also conserves judicial discretion; a judge may still elect to
impose bail if he or she wishes.209
A continuing problem that has affected states across the country, including
California, is overpopulation in prisons and jails.210 SB 10 protects California
from receiving lawsuits in regards to overpopulation.211 California’s prisons were
so over packed the Supreme Court determined them to be in violation of the
Eighth Amendment212—Governor Jerry Brown had to act to drastically lower the
prison population.213 This legislation will help California avoid any overcrowding
problems.214 A federal judge found the bail system in Harris County, Texas, to be
in violation of the Constitution.215 The county’s policy was to “detain indigent
misdemeanor defendants before trial, violating equal protection rights against
wealth-based discrimination and violating due process protections against pretrial
detention.”216 A study found that 40% of people arrested on misdemeanor
charges had been incarcerated the entire time it took their cases to resolve—
meaning that many individuals spent months in jail and were later acquitted or
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their charges were dropped.217 California’s action on bail reform will likely
prevent any future Constitutional challenges regarding pretrial detention, or
Eighth Amendment excessive bail lawsuits.218
For supporters of SB 10, the status quo punishes the poor for being poor.219
Opponents view the proposed legislation as a “get-out-of-jail-free card.”220 But
there is one thing both sides of the argument agree on:221 the current system is
unfair and does not work the way it should.222 Even Dog the Bounty Hunter, an
outspoken opponent of SB 10, acknowledges the California bail system needs
modernization.223 The more sensible critics of this legislation won their time to
try and work with the authors to better balance public safety and justice.224
Senator Hertzberg hoped to pass SB 10 in the 2017 legislative session, but with
the support of the governor and the Chief Justice of the California Supreme
Court, lawmakers can enact stronger bail reform legislation that is more thorough
regarding the fiscal effects and public safety concerns.225
V. CONCLUSION
“[Bail] is hostile to the poor man, and favorable only to the rich. The
poor man has not always a security to produce”
—Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 1835226
With SB 10, Senator Hertzberg aims to alleviate the economic inequality of
bail in California, which punishes the poor and disproportionately impacts people
of color.227 Bail was intended to ensure the return of the defendant before the
judge.228 But it is apparent there is an abundance of unintended negative
consequences from the current bail system.229 Wealthy defendants charged with
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violent crimes, like murder, will be released on bail.230 Meanwhile, poor nonviolent defendants sit in jail, waiting for trial, are likely to plead guilty just to get
out.231 Police arrested multi-millionaire real estate heir, Robert Durst, for the
murder of his neighbor, Morris Black, in 2001.232 Durst posted a $250,000 bail
and skipped town.233 Bragging about skipping town in an HBO documentary,
Durst proclaimed, “[g]oodbye 250 thousand dollars, goodbye jail. I’m out!”234
Contrast this with the tragic story of Kalief Browder.235 The 16-year-old kid, who
was wrongfully charged with robbing a man’s backpack, ended up spending
more than 1,000 days in Rikers Island Correctional Center because his family
could not afford the initial $3,000 bail.236 The current system allows the wealthy
to post bail and skip town, while the poor and a disproportionate number of
minorities fall into the bail trap.237
SB 10 is a step towards alleviating this inequitable problem in California’s
justice system.238 The uncertain costs of the implementation and use of the
county pretrial service agencies remain a big concern.239 However, lawmakers on
both sides of the aisle have voiced concern that a change is needed because the
current status quo is not carrying out justice in our criminal justice system.240 The
authors hope that this legislation brings the positive change to California that the
reforms in Santa Clara brought for that county.241 SB 10 is a complete overhaul
of the bail system and a necessary step forward.242 No longer will a pretrial
defendant be waiting for trial in jail solely because of an inability to pay bail.243
Under SB 10, a presumed innocent defendant can continue to support his family,
or housing. Even three days in jail can result in loss of wages, jobs and family connections, leaving some
defendants 40% more likely to commit a crime in the future.”).
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work a job, or keep the car or house.244 Innocent defendants who are arrested and
held without bail will no longer be pressured to plead guilty to crimes they did
not commit only to gain freedom.245 Senate Bill 10 is a considerable step towards
making California’s criminal justice system more just.246

244. Id.
245. Id.
246. It’s Time to do Away with California’s Cash Bail System, supra note 22.
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